Health Economics

Cournot EquilibriumAssumptionsThere is more than one tender which produce homogenous productThere is no collusion between unbendablesThe souseds proceeds decision affects the price of the goodThe takings of solids is generally fixedFirms compete via quantitiesThe firms argon rational actors in the economyGivenP 2000 - 2Q1 - 2Q2MC cdFor firm 1Q1 (2000 - 2Q1 - 2Q2 ) - four hundredQ12000Q1 - 2Q12 - 2Q1Q2 - four hundredQ1Taking the differential gear of the result decease for firm 1 with gossip to Q1 , equating it with zero2000 - 4Q1 - 2Q1 - four hundred 04Q1 2000 -2Q2 - 400Q1 400 - (Q2 /2For firm 2 , the response function isQ2 400 - (Q1 /2 Q2 400 - (400 - .5Q2 /2Q1 Q2 266 .662000 - 1066 .64 933 .

36Profit for Firm 1 and firm 2 isQ2800400 400 800 Q1Stackelberg EquilibriumGivenP 2000 - 2Q1 - 2Q2MC 400Q2 400 - Q1 /2Firm 1 is the loss leader firm 2 is the participator ?1 Q1[2000 - 2Q1 - 2 (400 - .5Q1 )] - 400Q1 ?1 Q1[2000 - 2Q1 - 800 Q1] - 400Q1 ?1 Q1 (2000 - Q1 - 800 ) - 400Q1 ?1 Q1 (1200 - Q1 ) - 400Q1Taking the derivative of the profit function (of firm 1 ) with respect to Q1 , we obtaind ?1 / Q1 1200 - 2Q1 - 400 02Q1 800Q1 400 Q2 400 - .5 (400P 800 Q2 200Q1 Q2Firm 1 profit ?1 320 000 - one hundred sixty 000 160 000Firm 2 profit ?2 160 000 - 80 000...If you want to check in a full-of-the-moon essay, order it on our website: Orderessay

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